
More evidence that the tipping point was reached
March 6, 2008We have argued elsewhere that a public opinion tipping point on climate action was reached sometime in Fall 2006. A real tipping point in public opinion — the kind that will drive major policy changes — is impossible to pin down, visible only in hindsight, and perhaps only to be determined by a future academic historian. But strong evidence that we are on the other side of that we’re-going-to-do-something-about-climate tipping point came as the confluence of two events over the past two days. The events draw a startling contrast with each other.
The first event was really a non-event. The last vestiges of a climate denier camp tried to play up doubt on climate and was greeted by one huge, collective yawn. (See this post for intelligent insight on climate tit-for-tat.) Such an event would have meant something two years ago. It means nothing now. Climate skeptics were once viewed with something between appreciation and respect by interested bystanders genuinely curious about this global warming thing they’d been hearing about. Climate skeptics are now increasingly viewed as crackpots, curmudgeons, or agenda-wielding cause advocates who are clothing their political interests in the name of climate science.
The Heartland Institute denier meeting came together on Monday. By Wednesday we saw just exactly why skeptic influence is over. The Energy and Air Quality subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee met to discuss climate policy in a four hour hearing. Gone from the agenda was the question that occupied previous sessions: is this really happening? On the agenda was a single question: what are we going to do about it? And deeper than just questions about the nature of a climate plan (cap and trade or carbon tax?), the hearing went into fine detail about trade considerations, tax incentives, how WTO mechanisms might interact with U.S. climate policy, and how to force China and India to play with us on climate.
Is this what a skeptic-influenced policy regime looks like? Or is this what it looks like when the collective decision has been made to do something about our climate risk, and the only question remaining is how we’re going to herd the cats and fight our way out of this paper bag?